Welcome to the Daily Kos community read of the Mueller report. We are working our way through the Mueller report at a pace of roughly 100 pages aper week. The introduction can be found here, and Part I is here.
If you’d care to join us, a free pdf of the redacted report is available from the Department of Justice. Multiple digital editions can be obtained from Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and/or Apple Books. I went with the Washington Post edition, out of habit, I guess, but there are plenty of editions to choose from. After listening to the report on Audible, I realized that I would need the large paperback edition that would let me highlight the text and write notes in the margin.
This past week House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jerry Nadler of New York and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff of California announced that Robert Mueller would publicly testify before their committees on July 17. Since he has already stated that everything he has to say on the matter of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election is in his report, it is unlikely that Mueller’s testimony will change what we already know—if, that is, we have read his report. And at roughly 100 pages per week, we should finish up by July 14.
Last week, we learned what the Russians did in their “sweeping and systematic” interference in our 2016 elections. This week, we look at Russia’s links to, and contacts with, the Trump campaign as well as how the special counsel’s office decided who to charge and with what.
Volume I, Section IV of the report examines the contacts between the Russian government and members of Trump’s campaign and transition staff beginning with Michael Cohen, Felix Sater, and the Trump Tower Moscow project which began as early as 2013 and continued through June 2016. Involved in the early discussions in fall 2015 wasFelix Sater, the mob-connected spy with a criminal record, whom the report refers to in its appended glossary simply as a “real-estate advisor who worked with Michael Cohen to pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project.”
Throughout this section of the report, no matter who the subject of the contact was, we see repeated use of the words “the Office was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony” and “the Office was unable to determine” or “based on the available information.” All of this strongly points to obstruction.
George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy adviser to the campaign, met with Joseph Mifsud, a professor at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP), in Rome and then in London during spring 2016, looking for dirt on Hillary Clinton and entrée to Vladimir Putin’s inner circle.
It is amazing how flexible the memories of the principal players have become. Papadopoulos met with Sergei Millian, founder of the Russian American Chamber of Commerce, on July 30 and August 1 ,2016. Within a year, he had forgotten all about the information Millian promised.
On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he would “share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work for the campaign.”509 Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter.510
The Special Counsel’s Office was unable to interview Millian, who was no longer in the United States and declined the Office’s repeated requests for an interview.
While investigating Carter Page’s outreach to the Russian government and his travel to Moscow to deliver a speech at the New Economic School’s commencement in July 2016:
The Office was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony about who Page may have met or communicated with in Moscow; thus, Page’s activities in Russia—as described in his emails with the Campaign—were not fully explained.
One of the emails referred to included a promise from Page to send campaign officials:
“a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I’ve received from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here.”
By June 2016, Russians were meeting with the Trump campaign’s inner circle including Jared Kushner, Paul Manafort, and Donald Trump Jr. in order to discuss adoption of Russian orphans by Americans—at least, that was the first excuse that the Trump campaign used to describe this meeting. What the description failed to include was that the adoption process had been suspended by Putin in response to the U.S. sanctions under the Magnitsky Act, and that the Russian lawyer offered weak tea about Clinton in hopes of a promise to lift the sanctions and repeal the Act.
It must have been a disappointment to the Americans, since the lure that got Donald Trump Jr. to the meeting was this email from Rob Goldstone, a British music promoter and publicist for Russian entertainer Emin Agalarov:
Good morning
Emin just called and asked me to contact you with something very interesting.
The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this morning and in their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father. This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump - helped along by Aras and Emin.
What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emin about it directly?
I can also send this Info to your father via Rhona, but it is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first.
Best,
Rob Goldstone
Trump Jr.’s response, as quoted in the report:
“Thanks Rob I appreciate that. I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I just speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time and if it’s what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next week when I am back?”685
And no one can remember, for sure, if the elder Donald Trump knew about the meeting before, during, or after it took place. The report promises more to come about this meeting in Volume II of the report.
The longest section appears to be about Paul Manafort’s ties to Russia and Ukraine. This makes sense, given Manafort's long history of work in the area. The report covers Manafort’s sharing of internal polling data and discussing campaign strategy with Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee with ties to Russian intelligence. It was expected that the information be shared with “others in Ukraine and with Deripaska.” Oleg Deripaska is a Russian businessman with ties to Vladimir Putin, for whom Manafort did consulting work between 2005 and 2009.
Richard Gates also worked with Paul Manafort.
Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as “political risk insurance,” and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.
And although the Mueller report doesn't mention this, keep in mind that the U.S. sanctions on Rusal, an aluminum company owned by a holding company controlled by Deripaska, were lifted by Mitch McConnell’s Senate to allow Rusal to pour some $200 million into McConnell’s home state of Kentucky. Although Manafort was in prison at the time this dirty deal was done, it looks like Deripaska may have found someone else to fulfill his role of finding “friendly political officials” to benefit Deripaska’s business interests.
There are plenty more contacts covered in the report, including the conversations that the Russian ambassador had with Jeff Sessions, Jared Kushner, and Michael Flynn. Also covered is the Seychelles meeting between Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev, the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). An entire section covering WikiLeaks has been redacted due to “harm to ongoing matter,” which may have something to do with the prosecution of Julian Assange
The Special Counsel’s Office explains clearly, in Section V of the report, why no charges of conspiracy were brought, and how conspiracy differs from collusion. The report also explains the decisions made on charging the Russians who conducted the “active measures” social media campaign with interference with U.S. elections and political processes. The Russian military intelligence officers of the GRU were charged with conspiring to ...
… hack into various U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S. persons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft and conspiring to commit money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A and 1956(h) (Counts Two through Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count Eleven). Netyksho Indictment.1277
Much of this sub-section is redacted.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which requires agents of a foreign principal to register with the attorney general, was used to charge Paul Manafort, Richard Gates, and Michael Flynn.
The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning of FARA or, in terms of Section 951, subject to the direction or control of the government of Russia, or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian government—or at its direction, control, or request—during the relevant time period.1282 [# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #] As a result, the Office did not charge [# # # # #] any other Trump Campaign official with violating FARA or Section 951, or attempting or conspiring to do so, based on contacts with the Russian government or a Russian principal.
Note that this is not an exoneration, but simply a statement that the investigation did not find enough evidence to sustain a conviction on the charges.
The discussion of campaign finance law and its application to the Trump campaign explains that the law bans foreign nationals from making contributions or donations to an American political campaign, and bans anyone from accepting such help.
… federal campaign- finance law broadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations, expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local candidate elections, and prohibits anyone from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such contributions or donations. As relevant here, foreign nationals may not make—and no one may “solicit, accept, or receive” from them—“a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value” or “an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election.”
And while it is clear with regard to many of the contacts, and specifically the June 9, 2016, Trump Tower meeting, that the Russians attempted, repeatedly, to make such contributions, the Special Counsel’s Office:
determined that the government would not be likely to obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons: first, the Office did not obtain admissible evidence likely to meet the government’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these individuals acted “willfully,” i.e., with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct; and, second, the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation, see 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)(A)(i).
It is against the law to lie to federal investigators and the Trump campaign, perhaps under the general rule that like attracts like, seemed to contain a whole lot of liars.
The Office determined that certain individuals associated with the Campaign lied to investigators about Campaign contacts with Russia and have taken other actions to interfere with the investigation. As explained below, the Office therefore charged some U.S. persons connected to the Campaign with false statements and obstruction offenses.
The persons covered under this section specifically include Papadopoulos, Flynn, Cohen, and Sessions, although the discussion of some individuals has been redacted due to harm to ongoing matters, grand jury redactions, and personal privacy concerns.
What struck you about this week’s read? I kept finding, like breadcrumbs, the inclusion of the phrases noted above that all point to obstruction. Then there were the absent messages, the use of apps that automatically delete messages, and the conveniently bad memories of many of the members of the Trump campaign.
The obstruction of justice law is more fully explained in Volume II, and that is what we have to look forward to next week.